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User or Designer; Who is in Control?
I am writing this editorial on my return from a
summer break in New England - a really
delightful part of the world. I hired a shiny,
brand new, car from Boston airport and in a
couple of weeks managed to put nearly 2000
miles on the clock. And it nearly drove me
mad. The car I mean. It may be that the
problem lay in the contrast with my car back
home, which is somewhat elderly, but the
problem presented itself to me as a battle for
control. Who is driving this damn car, me or
the control systems under the bonnet (I mean
the hood)?
I am familiar with flashing seatbelt signs if I
try to drive away in my car without putting on
my seatbelt. My wife's car has a persistent
(and deliberately irritating) clicking noise to
achieve the same end of forcing you to put on
the belt. This has frequently caused me to
reflect on the extent to which it is proper for
the designer to seek deliberately to manipulate
user behaviour - rather than merely facilitate
it. But nothing I have driven in the UK
prepared me for the degree of manipulation
that this new car sought to achieve.
As I was driving out of the airport - with only
5 minutes experience of the car - I entered a
tunnel. As the light level dropped, 'alert'
bleepers sounded and the whole dashboard
leapt to life in a quite alarming manner.
Lights came on automatically, and in the
second or so that it took me to work out what
was going on, I was lucky to avoid running
into the car in front. The following day (by
now I was up in Maine) it started bleeping
again, and since it was broad daylight I
assumed that something else must be amiss. I
finally tracked it down to low water level in
the windscreen washer bottle. It would not
stop bleeping - so I dutifully obeyed its
command and stopped at a garage to fill it up;
not because I particularly needed the
windscreen washer, but because I had an
urgent need to silence it! When, on the third
day, it started bleeping again, there was a
chorus from the back seat ... 'what does it
want NOW?'
[ could go on for some time listing all the
obsessive quirks of the control systems that
someone had decided I should be subjected to.
You can't drive over 5 mph without all the
doors locking ...you can't lock the car and
walk away leaving a window open, etc., etc.,
etc. I imagine that many of these functions
derive from the lunatic litigation culture in the
US that has probably resulted in car
manufacturers being sued for designing a car
that it is possible to fall out of - or one that
might get stolen because a window was left
open. But the result for me was that I was
constantly having to question 'what's it doing
now?' For it seemed to have a life of its own-
not to mention a deviant, obsessive
personality.
And in the cool light of day, wearing my
academic hat, I realise that my experience
with this car provides a frightening echo of
the everyday reality in civil aviation. In a
recent study of global fatal accidents (Civil
Aviation Authority, 1998) it emerges that 67%
of all fatal accidents in the period 1980-96
arose through crew error, or what might be
termed 'human factors'. Aircraft structures,
and the reliability of airframes and engines
has (according to the statistics) gone from
strength to strength, but the number of
accidents per passenger mile remains
stubbornly constant. The cause now is (most
likely) not engine failure or metal fatigue, but
pilot failure or crew error.
The reason that I was reminded (by my
irritating car) of this horrible statistic is that it
has been well established in the literature of
aircraft 'human factors', that the three most
common questions asked on the flight deck
between pilot and co-pilot are:
I. What's it doing now?
2. Why did it do that?
3. What will it do next?
To a mere passenger, who assumes that pilots
know exactly what is going on, this is
seriously worrying. For the reality of the
modern passenger aircraft is that flying is (for
the most part) done by the Flight Management
System (FMS). It automatically engages
procedures - and disengages them, with the
pilot acting as the (largely) passive observer
of this computer managed procedure. It
automatically raises and lowers flaps;
automatically pumps fuel from one tank to
another; automatically seeks out and responds
to radio beacons; automatically stabilises the
trim in turbulence; automatically maintains
cabin pressure and temperature; automatically
adjusts the rudder; automatically lowers the
undercarriage and automatically aligns the
aircraft on a glide path into its port of arrival.
In fact there is not much that it doesn't do.
So in normal flight (as pilots observe all this
automatic activity) the inevitable question for
cautious professional pilots will be 'why is it
doing that?', and we should hope that they
will not be too surprised by the answer to
'what will it do next?' In a more extreme
situation however, when the aircraft starts
doing something that the pilot thinks is
peculiar, the urgent challenge is to work out







pilot might then be in a position to decide
whether this is a good thing or not.
The questions I am forced to reflect on (by
my experience in the car) centre on who
designs FMS systems? And are they designed
to make flying easier for the pilot, or are they
designed to be a complete alternative pilot? In
fact, of course FMS system are not designed
at all (in the sense that they are not developed
by designers). Rather, they are programmed
by software engineers. And I suspect that the
same applies to the vehicle control systems in
the car. My experience of the resulting
product was that it appeared to be constructed
- like the very worst software - around what
the system was capable of doing, rather than
around what I wanted it to do.
Designers know that successful product
development starts with the user. This is so
central, that as early as Key Stage 2 the
design and technology curriculum requires
that pupils 'think about what products are
used for, and the needs of the people who use
them ...' And the reality of users is that they
are variable, adaptable, creative, and learn
from experience. In fact they represent the
very antithesis of system logic. Whilst it
might be tempting to believe that our in-flight
safety is assured by more and more high-tech,
(software driven) flight decks, the reality is
that the creative human pilot emerges as the
one who has to pick up, and deal with, all the
hassle that the systems create. In a recent
study across eight airline fleets, by far the
most common 'intervention events' by pilots
were classed as 'work-arounds' in which they
had to find ways to make the FMS system do
something that it didn't want to do. An
example of this is when the aircraft FMS
system is incompatible with the air traffic
control (ATC) system.
'If a height restriction is programmed in
for a descent and the aircraft is
subsequently cleared to a more distant
waypoint, the height restriction falls out.
This is incrcdibly irritating and very time
consuming. It destroys thc navigation
profile and a whole load of power comes
on because thc aircraft thinks it is now too
low, and by the time the restriction is
reprogrammed, the profile is
irrecoverable .... '
'Switching from one runway to a parallel
partner vcry close in. Once it has locked
on, this switching can only be achicvcd at
the expense of disengaging the autopilot
and switching off the flight directors. This
is a rcal design fault, especially at
somcwhere like Los Angeles (four parallel
runways) ...'
Studies of this kind are forcing the CAA (and
its European and American equivalents) to
devise procedures for training and
certification that consider the system as a
whole - including the human operator. And
about time too you might think. It is exactly
what a designer would expect to do - not to
mention 7-year-olds doing design and
technology. And, given the general law that
what happens in the US today will happen in
the UK in 10 years time, I sincerely hope that
car manufacturers do the same.
